The Milan Seminar in the History of Modern Moral Philosophy: Paul Guyer

Paul Guyer (Brown University)

A Supposed Right to Lie: Kant and Hutcheson

Abstract: This paper contrasts Francis Hutcheson’s consequentialist defense of rights of necessity, including but not limited to a right to lie in order to save innocent life in extreme situations, to Kant’s Insistence upon a non-consequentialist rejection of any ethical right to lie no matter the circumstances.  Among other differences, even though Kant admits a juridical right to lie as long as the addressee remains free to refuse to believe the lie, he holds that not only is lying always ethically impermissible, but that one may be held juridically responsible for any juridically impermissible consequences of a lie, whether foreseeable or not, while Hutcheson limits imputability in general to reasonably foreseeable consequences of actions.  The philosophical question in the paper is whether the foundations of Kant’s moral philosophy would not in fact leave some room for Hutcheson’s eminently reasonable conclusions.

February 20th, 2026, 15.00–17.00 (CET)
Online via Microsoft Teams

To register: 18ethics@unimi.it